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Abstract
Presented is a method for formal verification of pipelined proces-
sors with long instruction queues. The execution engine and the
fetch engine (where the instruction queue is) are formally veri-
fied separately, after abstracting the other engine with a non-
deterministic FSM derived from the high-level specification of
that engine. Without the presented method, the monolithic formal
verification of 9-stage, 9-wide VLIW processors—implementing
many realistic and speculative features inspired by the Intel Ita-
nium—scaled for models with 5 instruction-queue entries, but
ran out of memory if the instruction queue was longer. The pre-
sented method resulted in 2 orders of magnitude speedup for the
processor with 5 instruction-queue entries, and enabled scaling
for designs with 64 instruction-queue entries.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
B.6.3 [Logic Design]: Design Aids—Verification; F.3.1
[Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Programs]:
Mechanical Verification.
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Verification.
Keywords
Decomposition, Logic of Equality, Positive Equality, SAT.
1. Introduction
To improve the performance of pipelined processors by bridging
the gap between the speed of memory and CPU [12], designers
are using mechanisms such as instruction queues in order to
decouple the fetch engine from the execution engine, and allow
the fetch engine to continue supplying instructions when the exe-
cution engine is unable to accept them. The IBM PowerPC 750
[16] has a 6-entry instruction queue, the Intel Itanium [17][30] an
8-entry instruction queue, and the PicoJava processor [23] an
instruction queue that can hold up to 12 instructions. The goal of
this work is to develop an approach for formal verification of
complex pipelined processors with long instruction queues.
The logic of Equality with Uninterpreted Functions and
Memories (EUFM) [5]—see Sect. 2—allows us to abstract func-
tional units and memories, while completely modeling the con-
trol of a processor. Restrictions [31][32] on the modeling style
for defining high-level processors in EUFM resulted in correct-
ness formulas where most of the terms (abstracted word-level
values) appear only in positive equations (equality comparisons).
Such term variables can be treated as distinct constants [3], thus
significantly simplifying an EUFM correctness formulas, and
resulting in orders of magnitude speedup of the formal verifica-
tion; we call this property Positive Equality. The restrictions,
together with techniques to model multicycle functional units,
exceptions, and branch prediction [33], allowed our tool flow
[41] to be used at Motorola [19] to formally verify a model of the
M•CORE processor, and detect bugs. Our tool flow consists of:
1) the term-level symbolic simulator TLSim, used to symboli-
cally simulate the implementation and specification processors,
and produce an EUFM correctness formula; 2) the decision pro-
cedure EVC that exploits Positive Equality and other optimiza-
tions to translate the EUFM formula to an equivalent Boolean
formula; and 3) an efficient SAT-solver. The tool flow was also
used in an advanced computer architecture course [37][42].
Newly developed efficient SAT-solvers [8][25][28] signifi-
cantly sped up the solving of Boolean formulas from formal veri-
fication of processors, but would not scale for such formulas if
not for the property of Positive Equality (see [36]) that results in
at least 5 orders of magnitude speedup when formally verifying
complex dual-issue superscalar designs. Efficient translation to
CNF [38][39][40] led to another 2 orders of magnitude speedup.
2.  Background
The formal verification is done by correspondence checking—
comparison of a pipelined implementation against a non-pipe-
lined specification, using flushing [5][6] to automatically com-
pute an abstraction function that maps an implementation state to
an equivalent specification state. The safety property (see [41]) is
expressed as a formula in the logic of EUFM, and checks that
one step of the implementation corresponds to between 0 and k
steps of the specification, where k is the issue width of the imple-
mentation. (See [1] for a discussion of correctness criteria.)
The syntax of EUFM [5] includes terms and formulas. Terms
are used to abstract word-level values of data, register identifiers,
memory addresses, as well as the entire states of memory arrays.
A term can be an Uninterpreted Function (UF) applied on a list of
argument terms, a term variable, or an ITE (for “if-then-else”)
operator selecting between two argument terms based on a con-
trolling formula, such that ITE(formula, term1, term2) will eval-
uate to term1 when formula = true, and to term2 when formula =
false. The syntax for terms can be extended to model memories
by means of the functions read and write [5][35]. Formulas are
used to model the control path of a microprocessor, as well as to
express the correctness condition. A formula can be an Uninter-
preted Predicate (UP) applied on a list of argument terms, a prop-
ositional variable, an ITE operator selecting between two
argument formulas based on a controlling formula, or an equa-
tion (equality comparison) of two terms. Formulas can be
negated and connected by Boolean connectives. UFs and UPs are
used to abstract the functional units by replacing them with
“black boxes” that satisfy only the property of functional consis-
tency, i.e., equal input values produce equal output values. Then,
we will prove a more general problem—that the processor is cor-
rect for any functionally consistent implementation of its func-
tional units—but this problem is easier to prove.
We will refer to a transformation applied to both the imple-
mentation and the specification as a conservative approximation
if it omits some properties, making the new models more general
than the original ones. However, if the more general model of the
implementation is verified against the more general model of the
specification, then so would be the detailed implementation
against the detailed specification, whose additional properties
were not necessary for the verification. A conservative approxi-
mation may result in a false negative verification result, if the
omitted properties are required for the verification, but would not
lead to a false positive verification result.
923. VLIW Architecture to be Formally Verified
The goal of this paper is to formally verify variants of the
9-stage, 9-wide VLIW processor in Fig. 1—an extension of the
model from [34] with extra pipeline stages and an instruction
queue—for many entries in the queue. The Fetch Engine con-
tains the Program Counter (PC), and a read-only Instruction
Memory that is accessed over 2 clock cycles—in the two Instruc-
tion Fetch stages. The Instruction Memory maps the instruction
address, provided by the PC, to a VLIW packet of 9 instructions
that are already matched with one of 9 execution pipelines, each
containing a specialized functional unit: 4 pipelines with integer
units (Int FU), 2 with floating-point units (FP FU), and 3 with
branch-address units (BA FU). Instructions in a packet do not
have data dependencies between each other, as guaranteed by the
compiler, and any number of instructions in a packet can be
valid. Data values are stored in 4 register files—Integer (Int),
Floating-Point (FP), Branch-Address (BA), and Predicate (Pred).
A location in the Predicate Register File contains a single bit of
data. Every instruction is predicated with a qualifying predicate
register, such that the result of the instruction is written to archi-
tectural state only if the instruction’s qualifying predicate register
has a value of 1. A Branch Predictor supplies the Fetch Engine
with one prediction on every clock cycle.
Fig. 1.  Block diagram of the VLIW architecture that is formally verified.
A Current Frame Marker register (CFM) [17][30] is used to
remap the register identifiers for accessing the register files. The
CFM can be modified by every instruction in a packet. Two of
the Integer Functional Units can generate addresses for accessing
the Data Memory that stores both integer and floating-point val-
ues. An Advanced Load Address Table (ALAT) [17][30] is used
as hardware support for advanced and speculative loads, which
provide mechanisms for compile-time speculation. Both the
CFM and the ALAT are architectural state elements. The CFM is
updated speculatively in the first Register-Files-Access stage.
4. Results from Monolithic Formal Verification
The experiments were conducted on a Dell OptiPlex GX260 hav-
ing a 3.06-GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor with a 512-KB on-chip
L2-cache, 2 GB of physical memory, and running Red Hat Linux
9.0. The term-level symbolic simulator TLSim [41] was used to
generate the EUFM correctness formulas for safety of the mod-
els. The decision procedure EVC [41] was applied with the eij
encoding [7] of g-equations, where a new Boolean variable is
introduced for each unique low-level g-equation between term
variables; the property of transitivity of equality was enforced as
described in [4]. Translation of the Boolean correctness formulas
to CNF was done as described in [38][39][40]. The SAT-solvers
siege_v4 [28] and BerkMin621 [9] were used for the experi-
ments. The abstraction function was computed with controlled
flushing [6] for all of the designs.
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The first benchmark, 9×VLIW-8stages, did not have an
instruction queue. The monolithic formal verification of this
design took a total of 496 seconds—see Table 1. This processor
was then extended with instruction queues of between 1 and 6
entries—the models are designated with suffixes -IQ1, ..., -IQ6,
respectively. The resulting designs had 9 pipeline stages. The
monolithic formal verification of the models with 1 to 5 instruc-
tion-queue entries took, respectively, 3,163 seconds, 6,152 sec-
onds, 10,927 seconds, 18,415 seconds, and 29,328 seconds (8
hours and 9 minutes). Both SAT-solvers ran out of memory on
the CNF from the model with a 6-entry instruction queue.
The instruction queues were implemented as shift registers,
like in the PowerPC 750 [16]: the oldest instruction is always in
the first entry, and other instructions are placed sequentially in
subsequent entries. Such instruction queues with 2 or more
entries should satisfy the invariant constraint that if an entry is
empty then so are all subsequent entries. Checking the invariance
of these constraints for the processors having between 2 and 5
instruction queue entries, took between 0.28 and 0.37 seconds,
using the SAT-solver siege_v4 and including the time for term-
level symbolic simulation with TLSim and for translation of the
EUFM correctness formula to CNF by EVC.
5. Using Decomposition and Abstraction to Scale 
the Formal Verification
This paper advocates the separate formal verification of the Fetch
and Execution Engines, after abstracting the other engine with a
conservative approximation derived from the high-level specifi-
cation of that engine. In these conservative approximations, non-
determinism is used to abstract any actual implementation of the
control logic. To produce non-deterministic values, we can use
an FSM, where the initial state is an arbitrary term, the next state
is produced by a UF that depends on the present state only, and a
UP maps the present state to a new Boolean value. Since the ini-
tial state is arbitrary, then so is the first prediction produced
through the UP, and so is the next state (produced through the
UF) that will be used to determine the next prediction, and so on
[33]. The high-level specifications of the Fetch and Execution
Engines are provided by the formal verification engineer. 
In the case of the Fetch Engine, the high-level specification is
the same as the specification used in the monolithic formal verifi-
cation of the implementation processor, and consists of a latch
that contains the current PC value, a read-only Instruction Mem-
ory, a UF that maps the PC to the sequential PC value, and logic
to update the PC with the target address of a taken branch com-
puted by the Execution Engine. This high-level specification is
enriched with a generator of arbitrary values, used to control
whether to fetch a new instruction in each clock cycle of regular
Table 1. Statistics from monolithic formal verification of safety.
Processor
CNF Formal Verification Time [sec]
Vars Clauses TLSim EVC SAT Total
9×VLIW-8stages 43,329 1,033,915 0.18 7.9 488a
a. The SAT time for the first benchmark is from the SAT-solver siege_v4
[28], which was faster than BerkMin621 [9] on that CNF formula; the SAT
times for the other benchmarks are from the SAT-solver BerkMin621,
which was faster than siege_v4 on those CNFs.
496
9×VLIW-9stages-IQ1 55,676 1,513,618 0.23 11.5 3,151 3,163
9×VLIW-9stages-IQ2 73,883 2,418,165 0.24 14.9 6,137 6,152
9×VLIW-9stages-IQ3 95,272 3,628,526 0.29 26.5 10,900 10,927
9×VLIW-9stages-IQ4 143,677 6,383,040 0.36 50.4 18,364 18,415
9×VLIW-9stages-IQ5 148,693 7,245,211 0.37 55.7 29,272 29,328
9×VLIW-9stages-IQ6 181,045 9,782,015 0.43 73.2 >mem. ——
93symbolic simulation. If the non-deterministic output of this gen-
erator, signal ND_Complete, is false, then the PC is not incre-
mented, and signal Valid that is supplied to the Execution Engine
becomes false. In processors with branch prediction, the FSM
abstraction of the Fetch Engine is further enriched with a branch
predictor, which is itself abstracted with a generator of arbitrary
values, producing an arbitrary term for the predicted target, and
an arbitrary formula for the predicted direction. Signal Flush,
when asserted to true, controls the flushing of the implementa-
tion; signal Flush is false during regular symbolic simulation.
Fig. 2.  Abstraction of the Fetch Engine when formally verifying the Exe-
cution Engine. The Fetch Engine is abstracted with its high-level specifi-
cation, after that specification is enriched with a generator of arbitrary
values that determines whether to complete the fetching of a new instruc-
tion in each cycle. During regular symbolic simulation, when signal
Flush is false, signal Valid will have a non-deterministic value, formed as
the conjunction of the valid bit from the Instruction Memory and a non-
deterministic signal produced by the generator of arbitrary values.
Since signal ND_Complete is non-deterministic, then so is
signal Valid that is supplied to the actual implementation of the
Execution Engine. Then, during the one implementation step
needed to prove safety, the actual implementation of the Execu-
tion Engine will be supplied with a new symbolic instruction
non-deterministically. This behavior of the abstraction of the
Fetch Engine covers any actual implementation of this engine.
In the case of the Execution Engine, the high-level specifica-
tion is an FSM where the entire state of the Execution Engine is
abstracted with a single term, EX_State; the next state is com-
puted with UF NextState that has as arguments the present FSM
state and the new symbolic instruction supplied by the Fetch
Engine; the Target address of branch instructions is computed by
a UF, and the taken outcome of the branch (i.e., signal Squash)
by a UP, both of which also depend on the present FSM state and
the new symbolic instruction supplied by the Fetch Engine. The
decision whether to accept a new symbolic instruction from the
Fetch Engine is made non-deterministically, as determined by a
generator of arbitrary values. A branch is taken only if the new
symbolic instruction supplied by the Fetch Engine is valid (signal
Valid is true) and is accepted. For processors with branch predic-
tion, the FSM abstraction of the Execution Engine is further
enriched with a mechanism to detect branch mispredictions [33].
Since signal ND_Accept_bar is non-deterministic, then so is
signal Accept that is supplied to the actual implementation of the
Fetch Engine. Only valid and accepted instructions update the
state of the FSM abstracting the Execution Engine. Hence, this
FSM records the sequence of symbolic instructions supplied by
the Fetch Engine. In the specification used for formal verification
of the Fetch Engine, the Execution Engine is replaced by a deter-
ministic version of the same FSM, i.e., one that always accepts a
new instruction. If the Fetch Engine is formally verified with this
FSM abstraction of the Execution Engine, then the Fetch Engine
will be correct for any actual implementation of this FSM,
including the actual Execution Engine where the present state is
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contained in many memories and latches, and the next state is
computed by many UFs, UPs, and actual control logic. 
Fig. 3.  Abstraction of the Execution Engine when formally verifying the
Fetch Engine. The Execution Engine is abstracted with its high-level
specification—where the entire state is abstracted with a single term,
EX_State, that is updated only by valid instructions that are accepted—
after that specification is enriched with a generator of arbitrary values
that determines whether to accept a new instruction in each cycle.
6. Results from Using Decomposition and 
Abstraction for the Formal Verification
Table 2 summarizes the results from decomposition of the pro-
cessor into Fetch and Execution Engines, with each of them for-
mally verified after the other is abstracted as discussed in Sect. 5. 
The Execution Engine was formally verified in a total of 215
seconds. Models of the Fetch Engine with 1 to 64 entries in the
instruction queue were formally verified after 0.03 to 64.43 sec-
onds, respectively. (The decision procedure EVC ran out of
memory for a variant of the Fetch Engine with 128 entries in the
instruction queue.) Hence, the formal verification of a processor
with a 5-entry instruction queue takes 215 seconds—the sum of
the formal verification times for the Execution Engine and the
Fetch Engine with a 5-entry instruction queue. That is, the pre-
sented method results in 2 orders of magnitude speedup for the
processor with a 5-entry instruction queue, compared to its
monolithic formal verification (see Table 1). Furthermore, the
speedup is increasing for processors with longer instruction
queues. Most importantly, the presented method made possible
the formal verification of VLIW models with 64 entries in the
instruction queues.
Table 2. Statistics from formal verification of safety by using
decomposition of the processor into Fetch and Execution Engines, with
each of them formally verified after the other engine is abstracted.
Model
CNF Formal Verification Time [sec]
Vars Clauses TLSim EVC SAT Total
Execution-Engine 28,109 511,139 0.15 4.54 210 215
Fetch-Engine-IQ1 81 304 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Fetch-Engine-IQ2 177 743 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05
Fetch-Engine-IQ3 281 1,285 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06
Fetch-Engine-IQ4 397 1,985 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06
Fetch-Engine-IQ5 539 2,946 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.09
Fetch-Engine-IQ6 702 4,171 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.12
Fetch-Engine-IQ8 1,091 7,545 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.18
Fetch-Engine-IQ16 3,487 38,201 0.11 0.45 0.22 0.78
Fetch-Engine-IQ32 11,404 267,510 0.35 3.64 2.13 6.12
Fetch-Engine-IQ64 46,087 1,656,185 1.30 34.80 28.33 64.43
Fetch-Engine-IQ128 —— —— 5.22 >mem. —— ——
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947. Related Work
In order to formally verify processors with long pipelines,
researchers have proved the correctness of pipelining transforma-
tions [2][14][15][18][26], but invested months of manual work
or reported that their tools did not scale for complex designs. The
reverse approach is to use unpipelining transformations [10][11]
[20][21][22]. However, any set of such transformations would
require modifications to work on designs defined in a different
coding style, and significant extensions to scale for wide-issue
processors.
McMillan [24] used circular compositional reasoning to for-
mally verify an out-of-order processor. The design was decom-
posed into modules, and each of them was formally verified
separately, after its inputs were restricted appropriately by the
specifications of the other modules. Henzinger et al. [13] used a
similar approach, called assume-guarantee reasoning, but had to
invest extensive manual effort to formally verify even a 3-stage
pipeline with ALU and move instructions. Sawada and Hunt [29]
used theorem proving to formally verify an out-of-order model
with a 4-entry instruction queue, but had to define over 4,000
lemmas.
8. Conclusions
Presented was a method for efficient formal verification of pipe-
lined processors with long instruction queues. The execution
engine and the fetch engine (where the instruction queue is) were
formally verified separately, after abstracting the other engine
with a non-deterministic FSM derived from the high-level speci-
fication of that engine. Without the presented method, the mono-
lithic formal verification of 9-stage, 9-wide VLIW processors
with many realistic and speculative features scaled for models
with 5 instruction-queue entries, but ran out of memory for
designs with longer instruction queues. The presented method
resulted in 2 orders of magnitude speedup when formally verify-
ing the processor with 5 instruction-queue entries, and enabled
scaling for designs with 64 instruction-queue entries.
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